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ABSTRACT

!
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Examination of the Impact of Hospital M&A on Financial and Quality Metrics.
Department of Economics, June 2018.
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ADVISOR: PROFESSOR YOUNGHWAN SONG
!

The modern explosion of M&A activity in the United States has generated

significant controversy and advocates both for and against hospital consolidation have
been quite vocal in presenting their cases. Using mergers and acquisitions reports from
Irving Levin Associates as well as financial and quality metrics from the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services and the American Hospital Directory, this study
examines the differences between consolidated and unconsolidated hospitals in terms of
overall revenue and quality, in addition to prices and costs for specified diagnoses.
Consolidated hospitals undergo significant changes during their transition and often times
operate in a manner different than that of an unconsolidated hospital, suggesting that
these figures will be different on a comparison basis.
To asses the differences between consolidated and unconsolidated hospitals, this
paper uses Ordinary Least Squares regressions and three propensity score matching
methods: nearest neighbor, kernel, and stratification matching. These matching methods
are used to mitigate for the potential endogeneity associated with hospital M&A analysis.
This study finds that hospitals which underwent M&A between 2012 and 2014
have higher revenues but lower quality, while they charge lower prices and cost less to
payers for several of the presented diagnoses. To make hospital mergers and acquisitions
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truly efficient, consolidated hospitals should strive to increase quality while continuing to
operate in a financially efficient manner.
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CHAPTER ONE

!
INTRODUCTION
!

A. Hospital Mergers and Acquisitions

!

Since 2010, the United States has seen a boom in the number of hospital mergers

and acquisitions, following a historical pattern of large amounts of hospital
consolidations occurring over a time period of several years. Looking at the year 2016,
102 planned mergers and acquisitions were announced throughout the year, a 55%
increase over the year 2010 (Kaufman Hall & Associates, 2017). Due to the critical and
pervasive nature of the services which are provided by hospitals, changes within the
hospital market can have impacts on the entire U.S. population, both in terms of the the
quality of care delivered and the costs for the care. While the quality of care is most
directly felt by patients and their families, changes in the costs for care are mainly
absorbed by medical insurance providers, both public and private.
The modern healthcare era has presented a time where hospitals have struggled to
remain financially stable as a result of increased quality requisites and inconsistent
reimbursements from insurers. The threats that these hospitals face are real, 21 U.S.
hospitals shuttered in 2016 alone, many in rural communities which now have no easy
access to critical care (Ellison, 2017). Additionally, insurers both public and private are
seeking to curtail growing healthcare costs by linking payment values to quality and
efficiency of care, forcing hospitals to rethink their current models of care while facing
declining reimbursements (MacDonald, 2017). Many hospitals have turned to mergers
and acquisitions as a way to cut costs and remain afloat in the cutthroat healthcare
!1

market. Although M&A is often perceived by hospitals as a means to survival, hospital
consolidation is frequently met with arguments that hospitals use M&A as a way to
obtain more money from insurance providers while simultaneously providing lower
quality of care (Sutaria, 2013). As there are two sides to this hospital M&A story, the
conflicting arguments make it difficult to ascertain the real effects of hospital
consolidation.
Previous studies have examined the effects of hospital mergers and acquisitions
on price, cost, quality, and revenues. As exemplified by the current flurry of M&A
activity, hospital mergers and acquisitions tend to occur in waves, with the last explosion
of mergers and acquisitions occurring in the 1990s. The year 2010 marked the beginning
of a new wave which has not yet shown signs of slowing (Creswell and Abelson, 2013).
Several research studies have been conducted on the effects of the mergers of the 1990s,
while scholarly work is just now starting to examine the more recent wave. In the
developing body of present-day studies, Schmitt (2017) looks at operations cost
differences between hospitals as a result of consolidation for the years 1998 to 2012,
while Su (2017) examines Medicare cost and quality changes as a result of hospital
consolidation occurring between 2011 and 2013. When looking at hospital mergers and
acquisitions, it is important to consider both financial and quality dimensions as Su
(2017) does. The industry is an essential one which impacts the lives of the
overwhelming majority of Americans in terms of both financial costs and physical
wellbeing. This study is the first to examine price, cost, and quality effects of hospital
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mergers and acquisitions for the hospitals which underwent M&A in between 2012 and
2014, effectively encompassing both financial and quality analysis.

!
B. Contributions and Organization of this Study
!

In an effort to ascertain some of the potential outcomes of hospital mergers and

acquisitions, this study uses price, cost, and quality panel data from the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), M&A data from Irving Levin & Associates, and
hospital size and financial data from the American Hospital Directory. Additional sources
provided supplemental data to these key sets. Through comparing consolidated hospitals
and unconsolidated hospitals with similar bed sizes and state of operation, while
controlling for year effects and hospital type, this study finds that hospitals which have
undergone M&A have higher revenues, but lower quality. Consolidated hospitals also
post lower prices and costs for many of the diagnoses evaluated. These results suggest
that while consolidated hospitals may be delivering more financially efficient care, they
should direct additional attention to increasing the quality of care delivered in order to
deliver care that is efficient in terms of both cost and quality.
This thesis proceeds to explain the analysis of the implications of hospital mergers
and acquisitions on the revenues, quality, and costs and prices for hospital services.
Chapter 2 provides a formalized review of the outstanding literature on hospital M&A.
Chapter 3 continues to explain the economic model applied in this analysis and the
estimation methods used to arrive at the results, while Chapter 4 discusses the data
incorporated, the construction of the sample, and pertinent limitations. The empirical
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results are reviewed in Chapter 5, with relevant tables included at the end of the paper.
These results are extended to include implications and suggestions for future research in
the conclusion section found in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER TWO
A REVIEW OF THE IMPACTS OF HOSPITAL MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
This literature review examines existing studies of hospital mergers and
acquisitions. Specifically, this literature review analyzes work prompted by upticks in
hospital consolidation, paying particular attention to the characteristics of merging
hospitals and their markets, motivations for mergers and acquisitions, arguments against
consolidation, outcomes of consolidations with regards to cost, and outcomes with
regards to price.

!
A. Characteristics of Merging Hospitals and Markets
Due to the necessary services hospitals provide, hospitals exist in a wide variety
of markets and are not always characterized by the same traits. In studies of hospital
consolidations which consider impacts, economists have paid particular attention to
hospital ownership differences, as well as the differences in the hospital market
demographics. By recognizing that hospitals may change ownership type through
consolidations, Sloan, Ostermann, and Conover (2003) consider what may prompt an
ownership transition and conclude that hospitals are most likely to convert ownership
because of a low profit margin. A conversion from nonprofit or government ownership to
for profit status is most often preceded by consistently low margins and high debt-toasset ratios, while hospitals transition from for-profit to nonprofit soon after experiencing
declines in margins. The authors also note that many mergers are motivated not only by
low profit margins, but also by an ability and desire to increase market power. Further
!5

exploring hospital ownership type, Connor et al. (1997) focus on the characteristics of
hospital markets which see high volumes of hospital M&A. The researchers examine
market structure in defined health service areas to reason that hospitals merge most often
in areas with less market concentration, higher penetration of healthcare maintenance
organizations (HMOs), and in areas that are defined by fewer rural characteristics. When
looking at the characteristics of hospitals undergoing M&A, Connor et al. (1997) find
that hospitals engaging in mergers are less likely to be government owned, more likely to
be a member of a system, are larger in terms of beds and admission, and have higher
occupancy rates and case-mix indexes.
While Connor et al. (1997) and Sloan, Ostermann, and Conover (2003) endeavor
to determine important pre-merger conditions, in their study, Melnick, Keeler, and
Zwanziger (1999) compare nonprofit hospitals to for-profit hospitals to examine their
behavior after the completion of a merger. The study concludes that hospital mergers
which reduce competition in a market lead to both the merging hospitals and their
competitors raising their prices, hospital ownership status did not matter. The study also
acknowledges that nonprofit and government hospitals have increasingly become less
adverse to exploiting their market power through raising prices.
After identifying that only in-market mergers had been studied at length, Dafny,
Ho, and Lee (2016) test out of market merger consequences. The study concludes that
mergers and acquisitions which occur between hospitals which are not in the same
hospital referral region (HHR) generate a meaningful difference in price post-merger only
when the merging hospitals are located in the same state.
!6

Making additional contributions about hospital characteristics, Sloan (2001) looks
at the non-profit dominated hospital market to ascertain some of the differences between
non-profit and for-profit hospitals. The study finds that in terms of quality, hospital
ownership status did not make a difference, but for-profit hospitals were more expensive
to Medicare (Sloan, 2001).
Dafny (2009) notes in her study of hospital merger effects that hospital mergers
do not occur randomly and therefore, examining mergers and acquisitions with certain
estimation methods creates a problem of endogeneity. Her study corrects for this problem
by looking at the price increases of rival hospitals after a merger of nearby independent
hospitals, creating an interesting perspective on the market-wide impacts of hospital
mergers (Dafny, 2009).

!
B. Motivations for Mergers and Acquisitions
Defining some of the reasons which motivate hospitals to undergo costly and
strenuous mergers and acquisitions can help to better explain why between 1998 and
2012, the U.S. hospital market of approximately 5,000 acute care hospitals underwent
1,133 mergers and acquisitions (Novak, 2017). Cooper et al. (2015) looks at the
characteristics which are most prevalent in hospitals with desirable financial outcomes.
Hospitals may engage in M&A in order to obtain some of these characteristics. Their
study finds that being for profit, having more medical technologies, being located in an
area with high labor costs, behind a bigger hospital, being located in an area with lower
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income, and having a low share of Medicare patients are all market factors which are
associated with the ability to generate higher prices.
In their study of the modern landscape of hospital mergers and acquisitions,
Brown et al. (2012) identify that the Affordable Care Act (ACA), through enhancing
attention to quality and scrutinizing payments, may be driving consolidation in a few
ways. Under the ACA, payments to many hospitals will decrease as a result of the new
payment structures, therefore hospitals must find new ways to reduce or share costs and
strengthen negotiating ability with suppliers and insurers. The act also mandates
additional spending on compliance and technologies such as electronic health records
(EHR), areas where mergers and acquisitions may help hospitals achieve economies of
scale. Brown et al. (2012) argue that the ACA is driving hospitals to merge by rewarding
the hospitals which can leverage consolidation to lower their costs and improve quality.
Using pre - ACA data, Dranove and Shanley (1995) examine cost and reputation
as motivations for mergers and acquisitions and conclude that although costs are not
different between local hospital systems, there are reputation benefits associated with
creating a hospital system. Local hospital systems are able to develop a “brand identity”
which helps them to market a message of uniform quality across their system which in
turn draws in patients, creating a merger incentive.

!
C. Arguments against Consolidation
A common feature of the literature on hospital mergers and acquisitions is a
debate of the potential impacts of consolidation on the price and quality of care delivered.
!8

In reviewing the impacts of hospital consolidation, some economists have explicitly come
out against M&A activity as they fear that the pitfalls of M&A outweigh the benefits (Xu,
Wu, and Makary, 2015). Anti-consolidation advocates contend that there are other ways
to achieve these goals which do not impact the structure or competition of hospital
markets in a manner which leads to hospitals obtaining advantages not present with
healthy competition (Ramirez, 2014; Tsai and Jha, 2014). On their part, hospitals argue
that consolidation facilitates quality improvements and cost containment (Noether and
May, 2017).

!
D. Outcomes of Consolidation - Cost
As noted in Brown et al. (2012) and Dranove and Shanley (1995), a major
motivation for hospital consolidation is cost containment. The body of literature suggests
that cost savings are realized by hospitals after mergers (Connor et al. 1997; Lynk, 1995;
Schmitt, 2017). Specifically, Schmitt (2017) finds in his recent study that acquired
hospitals realize cost savings between four percent and seven percent in the years
immediately after acquisition. As there are different types of consolidation, Dranove and
Lindrooth (2003) look at differences between system-to-system mergers versus
one-to-one hospital mergers and find mixed results: system-to-system mergers yield no
significant cost savings while one-to-one hospital mergers realize cost savings of about
14%, further contributing that hospital and market characteristics are important when
evaluating impact. All above mentioned costs are operational costs incurred by hospitals,
in terms of labor and supplies that the hospitals must use in order to treat patients, with
!9

these results suggesting that hospitals that undergo M&A achieve greater economics of
scale and use the achievement to reduce their operational costs.
In her thesis, Su (2017) addresses changes in costs pre and post-merger for
specific diagnoses while defining cost in a different way. Su (2017) defines cost as the
amount Medicare pays to a hospital for a patient with a specific diagnosis. Her study
finds that there are no significant differences in costs to Medicare pre and post-merger for
the diagnoses covered in her study, but also concludes that while using mortality rates as
a proxy for quality, certain diagnoses have mortality rates which are higher in
consolidated hospitals.

!
E. Outcomes of Consolidation - Price
While considering the impact of hospital mergers and acquisitions on price, there
is considerable attention paid to price effects of mergers because if hospitals use M&A
strengthen their bargaining ability, this may allow them to charge higher prices and
subsequently receive higher reimbursements from insurers. The literature reviewed here
indicates that hospital mergers decrease competition in the market and allow hospitals to
significantly raise prices by asserting their new market power (Dafny, 2009; Dranove and
Shanley, 1995; Krishnan and Krishnan, 2003; Xu, Wu, and Makary, 2015). Estimates for
price increases range anywhere from nine percent to forty-five percent (Dauda, 2017; Xu,
Wu, and Makary, 2015). However, some of the literature suggests increased concentration
in the hospital market does not have a significant impact on price post - mergers (Moriya,
Vogt, and Gaynor, 2010).
!10

Although some of the available literature concluded that defining hospitals by
ownership type will not greatly impact the results on cost or prices after a merger or
acquisition because their behaviors may in fact be similar, this study controls for
ownership type and incorporates the bed size, state of operation, and year of
consolidation because they are hospital characteristics which could further impact price
and cost (Melnick, Keeler, and Zwangizer, 1999; Sloan, 2001). Using the same “cost”
definition as Su (2017), this study furthers the work on the impacts of mergers and
acquisitions on costs, examining more diagnoses than Su (2017), and also continuing the
work on quality done by the paper. This examination also corrects for the endogeneity
bias identified by Dafny (2009), something not done by Su (2017). To summarize, this
thesis contributes a study to the scholarly body on the revenue, quality, price, and cost
impacts of hospital mergers and acquisitions.

!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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CHAPTER THREE
ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY
This chapter contains both the econometric model and statistical methodology
used in this study. A description and discussion of the dependent and independent
variables is also included.

!
A. Econometric Model used to Estimate the Effects of Hospital Mergers and
Acquisitions
To determine how hospital mergers and acquisitions impact the dependent
hospital revenue, quality, cost, and price variables included in this study, this examination
employs the following econometric model:

!
Hospital Outcome = β0 + β1Treatment + β2Beds + β3HospitalType + β4Year + β5State + ℇ,

!
with ℇ as the error term.

!
Dependent Variables
GrossPatientRevenue

The total amount of revenue generated for
patient services.

TotalPerformanceScore

The total score received out of 100 on the
CMS Hospital Value Based Purchasing
Program assessment.

MedicarePayments039

Average Medicare cost for patients with
DRG 039: Extracranial Procedures without
Complications or Major Complications or
Comorbidities.
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AverageTotalPayments039

Average total cost for patients with DRG
039: Extracranial Procedures without
Complications or Major Complications or
Comorbidities.

AverageCoveredCharges039

Average total price for patients with DRG
039: Extracranial Procedures without
Complications or Major Complications or
Comorbidities.

MedicarePayments190

Average Medicare cost for patients with
DRG 190: Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary
Disorder with Major Complications or
Comorbidities.

AverageTotalPayments190

Average total cost for patients with DRG
190: Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary
Disorder with Major Complications or
Comorbidities.

AverageCoveredCharges190

Average price for patients with DRG 190:
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder
with Major Complications or Comorbidities.

MedicarePayments193

Average Medicare cost for patients with
DRG 193: Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy
with Major Complications or Comorbidities.

AverageTotalPayments193

Average total cost for patients with DRG
193: Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy with
Major Complications or Comorbidities.

AverageCoveredCharges193

Average price for patients with DRG 193:
Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy with Major
Complications or Comorbidities.

MedicarePayments282

Average Medicare cost for patients with
DRG 282: Acute Myocardial Infarction,
Discharged Alive without Complications or
Major Complications or Comorbidities.

AverageTotalPayments282

Average total cost for patients with DRG
282: Acute Myocardial Infarction,
Discharged Alive without Complications or
Major Complications or Comorbidities.

AverageCoveredCharges282

Average price for patients with DRG 282:
Acute Myocardial Infarction, Discharged
Alive without Complications or Major
Complications or Comorbidities.

MedicarePayments291

Average Medicare cost for patients with
DRG 291: Heart Failure & Shock with
Major Complications or Comorbidities.
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AverageTotalPayments291

Average total cost for patients with DRG
291: Heart Failure & Shock with Major
Complications or Comorbidities.

AverageCoveredCharges291

Average total price for patients with DRG
291: Heart Failure & Shock with Major
Complications or Comorbidities.

Note: GrossPatientRevenue definition comes from the American Hospital Directory, while all other
definitions come from cms.gov.

!
!
!

Independent Variables
Treatment

1 if the hospital underwent a merger of
acquisition between 2012 and 2014; 0 if not

Beds

The number of staffed beds available

HospitalType

A group of dummy variables which are equal
to 1 when the type matches the specified
hospital type; 0 if not. Types are broken
down between Government, Voluntary
Nonprofit, and Proprietary with further
subcategories.

Year

A group of dummy variables which are equal
to 1 when the year matches the specified
data year; 0 if not. Years range from 2011 to
2015.

State

A group of dummy variables which are equal
to 1 when the state matches the specified
hospital state; 0 if not. 18 states are included
in this analysis.

The dependent variables are divided between overall hospital variables and
diagnosis related variables. The dependent variable GrossPatientRevenue is an overall
variable equal to the revenue earned by hospitals in the year 2017 in constant 2015
dollars. The second overall hospital variable, TotalPerformanceScore, is used as a
measurement of hospital quality. The variable encompasses scores given by the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for mortality, experience of care, safety,
efficiency, and cost reduction. This study includes this variable as a means of comparing
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unconsolidated and consolidated hospitals on a basis of quality of care delivered, as the
quality of care delivered should be the among the most important considerations, but also
because CMS has begun to link reimbursements to the quality of care delivered. The
inclusion of this variable helps to estimate whether or not consolidated hospitals will be
able to maintain their level of reimbursements or if they should expect to see declines in
reimbursements as compared to their unconsolidated peers as a result of their quality
scores.
The next group of dependent variables are diagnosis specific and pertain to the
prices and costs for the five diagnoses selected for analysis in this study. All five
diagnoses, DRGs 039, 190, 193, 282, and 291 were chosen from the 100 most common
Medicare covered diagnoses. The diagnoses were selected from this group in the hopes
that their common occurrence would allow for them to have sufficient data for many of
the merged and unmerged hospitals in the analysis. It is important to note that the
diagnoses are only inclusive of the population which Medicare provides insurance for,
typically U.S. citizens over the age of 65, and therefore these diagnoses may not be
among the most frequent across the entire U.S. population. The prefixes for the study
diagnosis variables, MedicarePayments, AverageTotalPayments, and
AverageCoveredCharges denote whether or not the variable is a price or cost for the
diagnosis. The MedicarePayments prefix refers to the average cost to Medicare for a
patient diagnosed in that hospital with that particular condition after Medicare applies
algorithms to determine payment amount and the hospitals respond with negotiations
relating to advanced costs for particular patients related to severity, complications, and
!15

comorbidities. AverageTotalPayments is similar to the MedicarePayments prefix, but
refers to the average amount that supplemental insurance and patients pay to cover the
remainder of charges for the diagnosis. This number is also subject to negotiations
between insurances and the hospitals. If one were to add MedicarePayments and
AverageTotalPayments for a diagnosis, they would arrive at the total cost to all payers for
the diagnosis. Finally, the prefix AverageCoveredCharges describes the average sticker
prices charged by hospitals for the five diagnoses included in this examination.
AverageCoveredCharges are the contributing values to GrossPatientRevenue,
representative of the amounts hospitals would receive if they were not subject to
reductions from Medicare or other insurers.
Based upon the factors identified by Brown et al. (2012) as motivations for
mergers and acquisitions, the expectation is that GrossPatientRevenue will increase as a
result of consolidation. Brown et al. (2012) indicate in their review of modern
motivations for hospital M&A that hospitals engage in consolidations in order to
strengthen bargaining power with insurers. This suggests that hospitals will use this
heightened ability to charge a higher sticker price to insurers based upon their ability to
obtain more in payments. There is an expectation that quality will be lower in hospitals
which underwent a merger or acquisition as proponents of increased scrutiny for hospital
mergers and acquisitions often argue that consolidated hospitals provide patients with
lower quality care (Ramirez, 2014; Tsai and Jha, 2014). In her examination of hospital
M&A which uses mortality as a proxy for quality, Su (2017) finds that mortality rates
increased in hospitals which underwent M&A between the years of 2011 and 2014,
!16

suggesting that lower quality of care is being delivered in consolidated hospitals. The
diagnosis variables of MedicarePayments, AverageTotalPayments, and
AverageCoveredCharges are also expected to have positive coefficients. Following the
thinking of Brown et al. (2012) presented above, GrossPatientRevenue is a summation of
all the diagnosis values for AverageCoveredCharges, therefore the increased bargaining
power should increase the individual diagnosis prices as well. The ability of hospitals to
exact more from insurers and other payers should increase the two cost variables,
MedicarePayments and AverageTotalPayments, because the larger hospitals will use their
strengthened negotiating clout to garner more in return for their services from insurers,
effectively costing both Medicare and non-Medicare payers more.
The independent variables were selected because of their potential impacts on the
outcome variables for hospitals. The key independent variable, Treatment, divides
hospitals on the basis of whether or not they underwent a merger and acquisition between
the years of 2012 and 2014. This variable creates the primary comparison groups for this
study before additional specifications are applied. The next independent variable assessed
was Beds, which is equivalent to the number of staffed beds in a hospital via the Irving
Levin and Associates reports for merged hospitals and from the American Hospital
Directory for unmerged hospitals. Current research suggests that hospitals with greater
numbers of staffed beds may deliver lower quality of care while costing more to
insurance and Medicare, particularly in the case of highly regarded and highly expensive
academic medical centers (Ibrahim, 2016). Beds is used as a contributing value to the
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propensity score matching methods which will be discussed in the statistical
methodology.
As business entities, hospitals are not all the same, therefore the independent
variable HospitalType controls for the differences in hospitals which come from the
ownership types. This study incorporates hospitals which file their taxes as Government,
Voluntary Nonprofit, and Proprietary organizations. The majority of U.S. hospitals file as
Voluntary Nonprofit, with approximately 50% of U.S. hospitals specified as nonprofit in
2016 (American Hospital Directory, 2018). Government organizations are further
separated by State, Local, Federal, and Hospital District, while Voluntary Nonprofit has
Church, Private, and Other specifications. Government and Voluntary Nonprofit hospitals
behave in a manner which does not seek profits, but still strive to maintain their financial
viability while Proprietary hospitals seek to maximize profits and return to stakeholders,
potentially creating differences in the way these hospitals deliver services. The
independent Year variable holds constant the fluctuations which pertain to the years
included in this analysis, creating a dummy variable specification for every year
incorporated in the analysis. The study uses price and cost data from 2011 to 2015 and
M&A data from 2012 to 2014. The inclusion of Year also allows for the data alignment
from various sources. The final independent variable, State, controls for state level effects
which may have impacted the resulting estimates. Dafny, Ho, and Lee (2016) establish in
their study that state level hospital markets are important in the sense that mergers and
acquisitions within the same state do generate significant differences in prices post
merger. The 2016 study examines beyond hospital referral region (HRR) markets
!18

typically studied in hospital M&A analysis and shows that mergers and acquisitions do
not matter between hospitals located in different states, suggesting that unique
characteristics within state markets allow for significant price effects to occur after M&A
(Dafny, Ho, and Lee, 2016). Based upon the results of Dafny, Ho, and Lee (2016), State
also contributes to the propensity score by creating matches for consolidated hospitals
within the same state to ensure that consolidated hospitals receive matches with
unconsolidated hospitals which are subject to similar market characteristics.

!
B. Statistical Methodology
!

This paper uses two separate methods to estimate the econometric model. The

study includes Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates and three different propensity
score matching methods: nearest neighbor, kernel, and stratification matching. Due to the
fact that studies of hospital mergers and acquisitions are observational and these hospitals
mergers and acquisitions do not occur randomly, certain estimations of the effects of
hospital mergers and acquisitions may be biased due to an endogeneity problem.
Identified by Dafny (2009), this problem arises from the difficulty of controlling for the
motivation of every hospital merger and acquisition, potentially correlating the merger
term with the error term in regressions. This study still uses OLS estimates to try to
determine the effect of hospital mergers and acquisitions on revenue, quality, prices, and
costs, but these estimates may be biased due to endogeneity because all merger motives
are not controlled for.
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To produce estimates not biased by endogeneity, three types of propensity score
matching are also used. The hospitals are first separated on a basis of whether or not they
underwent a merger or acquisition, and then an estimated propensity score is constructed
with the staffed bed size, year of data, state, and hospital type. The estimated propensity
scores are then used in the three propensity methods to create matches for comparison
based upon the methodology of each propensity score method. In short, Nearest neighbor
matching compares hospitals which are most like one another, kernel matching compares
each merged hospital to the average of the unmerged, and stratification matching
compares intervals of scores. These three methods prevent the endogeneity generated by
this observational study by assuming that the treatment, in this case M&A, is exogenous,
allowing for inferences to be made about the effects of the treatment. A detailed
description of the three matching methods is available in Appendix A2.

!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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CHAPTER FOUR

!
DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE SELECTION
!

Chapter Four contains the data selection process and uses of data in this study. It
includes an overview of the data sources, what variables were taken from each source,
and their relevant limitations. Chapter Four also provides an explanation of how the data
sample was constructed for this study and the descriptive statistics for the dependent
variables.

!
A. Overview of the Data
To look at the price and cost effects of hospital mergers and acquisitions, this
study gathers M&A data from Irving Levin Associates’ publication, The Health Care
Services Acquisition Report. Irving Levin Associates is a trusted provider of healthcare
sector market intelligence for both investors and researchers (Irving Levin Associates,
2017). Irving Levin reports have been the primary provider of M&A information in many
recent hospital studies, including Su (2017) and Schmitt (2017). Detailed hospital sector
reports were obtained for the years 2012, 2013, and 2014. The reports provided the target
acquisition hospital, ownership type, location, size, basic financial information, and deal
structure, as well as the acquiring hospital name and location.
The analytical assessment of mergers and acquisitions can be problematic because
of the risk of endogeneity, identified by Dafny (2009). A problem of endogeneity can
occur because hospital mergers and acquisitions do not occur randomly, therefore the
merger or acquisition term in analysis is likely correlated with the error term containing
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the consolidation motivation. Although the deals provided by Irving Levin and Associates
provided some of the motivations for M&A, the motivations can be tough to quantify and
were not incorporated in every deal structure. Therefore, the mergers and acquisitions
provided by Irving Levin Associates could very well suffer from the endogeneity when
analyzed. The analysis done in this study on M&A effects mitigated for the endogeneity
problem by using propensity score matching methods.
In order to select hospitals for comparison to ascertain the effects of M&A
activity, a dataset was constructed from the most current American Hospital Directory.
The American Hospital Directory is a national level provider of statistics on U.S. acute
care hospitals (American Hospital Directory, 2017). Organized by state, the AHD
directory provides cross-sectional data in the form of hospital name and total number of
staffed beds, as well as the nominal gross revenue generated by providing care to
patients. For the purposes of this analysis, the gross revenue values were chained to
constant 2015 dollars. The American Hospital Directory compiles the state level data lists
from a variety of reputable sources, including the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services and the Joint Commission. A limitation of the American Hospital Directory data
is that archived databases are not available, therefore the data incorporated in this study is
the most recent data available. Although the merged hospitals were assessed based upon
their staffed bed count at the time of the merger, they were matched with hospitals based
upon a more recent number of staffed beds. The lack of an archived database prevents a
comparison of consolidated hospitals to the unconsolidated hospitals which were most
like them at the time of the merger.
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Hospital ownership type is a characteristic which has been examined for price and
costs effects in the outstanding literature because hospitals of differing ownership types
operate in different ways (Melnick, Keeler, and Zwanziger, 1999). This study sought to
control for these effects by controlling for hospital ownership type. The cross-sectional
hospital ownership type data came from Data Lists, a database broker for a wide variety
of U.S. industries (Data Lists, 2018). Data Lists builds databases using a research team,
who combines internet research and interview methods to construct the sets. The database
divides hospitals into several ownership categories: Government, Voluntary Nonprofit,
and Proprietary. Hospitals are further divided within Government and Voluntary
Nonprofit, with Government divided between Federal, Hospital District, Local, and State,
and Voluntary Nonprofit divided into Private, Church, and Other. This database is the
most current available, with no archived data available, similar to the limitations of the
American Hospital Directory data. Although the hospitals which underwent mergers and
acquisitions used their hospital ownership status at the time of consolidation during the
analyses, all other untreated hospitals were updated to this most recent ownership type,
which may have created biased estimates if unconsolidated hospitals were to have
converted ownership type in the defined time period, but were most like a consolidated
hospital at the time of M&A.
Data Lists also provides data for the number of beds within the hospitals, similar
to the information provided by the American Hospital Directory. The American Hospital
Directory bed data was selected for this analysis because although the database provides
fewer hospitals than Data Lists, the database provided by Data Lists did not provide a
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number of beds for every hospital within the database and also did not specify if values
provided for beds were the licensed or available staffed beds.
The measure of hospital quality used in this analysis was a measure of overall
hospital performance derived from a weighted combination of scores in four areas of
care. This data comes from the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (HVBP) program,
which is run by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. HVBP is an initiative
which uses a combination of outcomes, patient experiences, safety, and cost reduction
measures to measure quality of care in hospitals. The program adjusts Medicare
reimbursement rates for hospitals based upon their HVBP scores (Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services, 2017). The data used for this analysis for all hospitals comes
from the December 2017 scores given to hospitals, the most current available, but may
limit analysis because the hospitals were unable to be evaluated on their scores at the
time of merger or acquisition or on a continual basis.
The panel nominal price and cost data for the selected diagnoses come from the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Provider Utilization and Payment
Inpatient Database. Data sets were obtained for the years 2011 - 2015 and contain
average price, cost, and discharge statistics for the 100 most common covered inpatient
diagnoses for all U.S. hospitals which are certified by Medicare (Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services, 2018). In this study, the price and cost values were chained to
constant 2015 dollar to mitigate the effect of inflation. While prices are the amounts that
hospitals attempt to receive for rendering medical services, costs are what Medicare and
other payers of healthcare actually pay for these diagnoses. The final amount paid by
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Medicare is a product of an algorithm which combines factors including identified
diagnosis, severity of diagnosis, teaching hospital status, and proportion of patients
served who are uninsured or who receive Medicaid. In an effort to encourage elevated
quality of care, Medicare also linking an increasing portion of reimbursements to
outcomes and quality of care delivered (Reinhardt, 2010). The open availability, national
scope, and range of diagnoses included in the data made the Medicare set suitable for this
analysis. The data is limited in the fact that Medicare only purchases care for senior
Americans, so the inpatient diagnoses included are not reflective of the entire U.S.
population. The data spans a sufficient number of years to ensure that all mergers and
acquisitions assessed in this analysis have price and cost data available for one year prior
and one year after the merger or acquisition event. A detailed description of the individual
variables used in this study is available in Appendix A1.

B. Determination of the Sample
This paper originally draws from 9,074 hospitals located in the United States.
Hospitals located outside of the 50 states or Washington D.C. were not used for this study
because this paper specifically examines the effects of merger and acquisitions on the
U.S. hospital market. Hospitals located outside of this geographic specification are
subject to different healthcare delivery and payment systems, and may not have the same
data available as the hospitals within the U.S. market. Beyond the geographic
specification, the hospitals had to meet several criteria in order to be used in the final
sample. The hospitals had to be general acute care, non specialty hospitals and reported
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on by the American Hospital Directory to ensure availability of annual bed, gross patient
revenue, and state data. Furthermore, the hospitals had to be Medicare certified. The final
hospitals also had to be participants in the Hospital Values-Based Purchasing (HBVP)
Program in 2017 for the included annual quality score. After applying these criterion,
3,277 hospitals were part of the final analysis, where 161 of these hospitals underwent
consolidations in the years 2012 to 2014.

!
C. Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables of the 3,277 hospitals evaluated
in this study can be found in Table 1. Surprisingly, the statistics show that consolidated
hospitals have an average revenue in USD that is lower than that of unconsolidated
hospitals, and less surprisingly have a lower average quality score out of 100 possible
points. These statistics suggest that on average, hospitals which do not undergo M&A
earn higher revenues and perform better on the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) quality analysis. The CMS quality scores are an important figure which
net hospitals higher reimbursement rates for higher scores, while comparatively high
revenues are also important in an era where many hospitals struggle to keep their doors
open. Based upon the descriptive statistics presented, consolidated hospitals need to work
to increase both their revenues and quality in order to remain viable moving forward,
particularly as quality dictates a greater percentage of compensation.
There were no significant differences found between the unmerged and unmerged
hospital groups in terms of the average number of staffed beds. When rounded, both
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merged and unmerged hospitals had an average of 227 staffed beds. The remainder of the
descriptive statistics show very few significant differences between the two hospital
groups, however, there are differences in the price in USD charged by hospitals for DRGs
039, 193, and 291, all demonstrating that hospitals which have undergone M&A charge
less on average for the care provided for these diagnoses, potentially an indication of the
reasoning for the lower average revenue. The varied number of observations for the
overall hospital metrics as well as the diagnoses is reflective of the challenges of working
with observational data. The overall hospital metrics provide averages based upon the
entire sample of 3,277 hospitals, while each diagnosis looks at only a subset of these.
This is due to the fact that although these diagnoses were selected from the 100 most
common Medicare diagnoses, not all hospitals have a significant amount of cases in the
data set or contain complete data for evaluation.

!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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CHAPTER FIVE

!

EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF THE EFFECTS OF HOSPITAL M&A ON REVENUE,
QUALITY, COSTS, AND PRICES

!

This chapter contains the summary of the empirical results gathered during this
study, including estimates from both the OLS and propensity score matching method
regressions. Additionally, this chapter compares the results of this study to published
studies and reviews the potential limitations of these results.

!

A. Empirical Results
Estimates of the effects of mergers and acquisitions for all dependent variables
using OLS and the three specified matching methods can be found in Tables 2 and 3
respectively. In Table 2, Columns 1 and 2 contain the estimates for all dependent
variables for the Treatment and Beds regressors from the OLS regressions, while
Columns 1, 2, and 3 in Table 3 contain the estimates for all dependent variables for the
nearest neighbor, kernel, and stratification matching methods. A further explanation of
the matching methods utilized is available in Appendix A2.
Both tables control for year, state, and hospital type differences which could bias
the estimates. Although the results varied in significance and the coefficients may have
varied due to the means of comparison used in the matching methodologies, the study
found that the three matching method estimates are largely in support of each other.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2, displaying the Treatment and Beds OLS regressors,
presented very different results in terms of quantities of significant values. All values for
Beds in Column 2 had significant outcomes, with all positive coefficients with the
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exception of TotalPerformanceScore, the quality measure. The negative quality
coefficient demonstrates that having a greater number of beds decreases the quality of
care delivered. It is important to note that the staffed beds data was scaled during
analysis, where coefficients are equal to increases of 100 beds. The positive coefficient
indicated that increasing hospital staffed bed size by 100 creates significant increases in
revenue of about 40%. An increase of 100 beds was shown to generate significant
increases in prices and costs for all included diagnoses. The Treatment results in Column
1 for the revenue and quality dependents were similar to the results of Column 2 in terms
of coefficient sign and significance, finding that revenue significantly increased for
consolidated hospitals, but quality significantly decreased. In terms of additional
significant results, Treatment only suggested that there were significant decreases in the
price for DRG 039 and the cost to Medicare for DRG 190 for hospitals which had
undergone M&A.
Following the results found in Table 2, all three matching methods found in Table
3 indicate that consolidated hospitals experience significant increases in revenue when
compared to their unconsolidated peers. Also similar to the results found in Table 2, both
kernel and stratification matching support that hospitals which have undergone a merger
or acquisition in the defined time period deliver significantly lower quality of care. When
looking at prices and costs for the included diagnoses, all available matching methods
display significant and negative results for the price of DRG 039, 190, 193, and 291,
indicating that consolidated hospitals charge payers less for these diagnoses. The
combination of negative price coefficients with increased revenues is a surprising one, as
!29

revenue is a composite of prices. This is a potentially a function of consolidated hospitals
serving more patients, or charging more for diagnoses not assessed in this analysis.
Columns 3 and 4 both show negative and significant outcomes for the Medicare cost for
DRG 039, as well as the price of DRG 282, showing comparatively lower cost and price
for these diagnoses. The nearest neighbor and stratification matching methods both
display that the cost to Medicare is lower for DRG 193. Of all three columns, the nearest
neighbor method offered the most significant results, all of which were negative with the
exception of the revenue variable. This outcome means that the comparison created by
the nearest neighbor method of estimation generated the most significant differences
between the hospital groups of all three methods of estimation attempted in Table 3. This
shows that when hospitals are compared on this basis, consolidated hospitals experience
lower quality, prices, and costs than their unconsolidated counterparts.

!
B. Comparison to the Literature
While considering the price and cost effects of mergers and acquisitions in this
analysis, this study is largely in line with the findings of several of the previous studies
(Connor et al. 1997; Lynk, 1995; Schmitt, 2017). Although his study looks specifically at
the costs incurred to hospitals pre and post mergers, Schmitt (2017) finds that hospitals
experience cost savings of between four percent and seven percent after undergoing a
merger. The significant results found for the prices charged by consolidated hospitals as
well as the results for Medicare and non-Medicare costs agree with the outcomes of the
Schmitt (2017) study. In order for hospitals to post lower prices and accept lower
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reimbursements from payers, a reduction in costs on their end is required for hospitals to
keep their doors open.
Although this study does agree with several others, there are studies which it
disputes as well. In their review of outstanding studies on the impacts of consolidation on
price, Xu, Wu, and Makary (2015) assert that consolidated hospitals increase the prices
charged and also increase the bargaining clout for hospitals to exact higher payments
from insurers. This difference may be a reflection on the specific markets examined in the
studies reviewed by Xu, Wu, and Makary (2015). The researchers focused on the
California market, particularly California based insurers and the metropolitan hospital
markets of Los Angeles and San Francisco. California is a densely populated state with
close to 350 hospitals, with many of these hospitals located within the same county or
metropolitan area. California’s hospital market is also characterized by a large amount of
consolidated hospital networks and a high number of mergers and acquisitions (American
Hospital Directory, 2017). The results of the Xu, Wu, and Makary (2015) examination
may in fact be a reflection of a market which is no longer competitive because of the
large number of hospital systems and consolidations, while this study looks at a broader
geographic range where consolidation activities could be helping to support hospital
savings.

!
!
!
C. Limitations of the Results
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This study presents OLS regressions which control for year, state, and hospital
ownership type effects. Dafny (2009) suggests in her study that these types of regressions
may suffer from endogeneity because hospitals do not undergo mergers and acquisitions
randomly, and choose to partake in them for a wide variety of reasons, making it nearly
impossible to control for all of these motivations to prevent a correlation with the error
term. Although the estimates presented in this study may still suffer from endogeneity
after the use of select controls, the use of the three propensity matching methods was
incorporated to produce results theoretically unbiased by endogeneity.
The examination uses a Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services performance
score as a proxy for quality, however the performance score is not inclusive of a wide
range of measures and is skewed to examine outcomes which are part of ongoing
Medicare quality initiatives. Quality in healthcare is tough to define and may mean
different things to different patients, therefore the quality results found by this study may
not be the same if a different quality measure was selected.
The estimates presented in Tables 2 and 3 may be biased as a result of the data
used in the analysis. Much of the data used, including staffed beds, revenue, quality, and
hospital type were the most current values available for unconsolidated hospitals, with no
previous data available for the years 2012 - 2014 that the mergers and acquisitions
occurred in. In terms of revenue and quality, this curtailed the breadth of the analysis
available for these dependent variables by only allowing for one year of analysis. All
unconsolidated hospitals had staffed bed and hospital type data that was the most updated

!32

available, preventing the matching of consolidated hospitals with the hospital that was
most like them at the time of the merger or acquisition, a potential risk for the estimates.

!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Summary of Study Findings
By creating a comparison between hospitals that underwent a merger or
acquisition in 2012 through 2014 and hospitals which did not consolidate in that time
period, this study examines the differences between these two groups in terms of prices
charged by the hospitals for services, costs to Medicare and other healthcare payers,
hospital revenue, and hospital quality. This study is the first to look at both prices charged
by hospitals alongside the costs realized by healthcare payers while correcting for the
endogeneity associated with hospital M&A analysis.
This analysis finds that regardless of whether or not a hospital underwent a
consolidation activity, hospitals which have a greater number of beds have higher
revenues, charges more for services and incur higher costs to payers, while quality
decreases as the number of beds increases. This study also finds that hospitals which
engaged in M&A in the defined time period generally had higher revenues, lower quality,
and in the case of many diagnoses, posted lower prices and had lower costs for payers.

!
B. Implications of the Findings
!

The results of this study contribute to the widening debate on hospital M&A and

how to best police it moving forward. Advocates for the prevention of hospital
consolidation publicize that hospitals which have undergone mergers or acquisitions exert
their market power to charge higher prices and elicit higher reimbursements from payers,
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however this study does not support that claim and in fact directly disputes it with the
results for several of the study diagnoses. However, an additional claim made by
opponents of hospital M&A is that consolidated hospitals end up delivering lower quality
care to patients. This argument is supported in this study, patients do receive significantly
lower quality care in hospitals which merged between 2012 and 2014.
As hospitals struggle to remain secure in a market with quality tied
reimbursements and ever increasing costs, a major motivation for hospitals to pursue
mergers and acquisitions is to stabilize or increase their revenues. This study
demonstrates that consolidated hospitals significantly increase their revenues, promoting
this as a potential option for hospitals which may be struggling.
The above results contribute to a greater overall picture, the outcomes of this
study indicate that hospital M&A is a viable way for hospitals to lower prices and costs to
payers with respect to certain diagnoses while also increasing their revenues. Work still
needs to be done in terms of pairing these successes with increased quality in order to
achieve efficiency which encompasses both financial and quality metrics. Consolidated
hospitals need to increase their quality in order to maintain their levels of reimbursement
and make M&A a truly viable option.
The results of the analysis regarding the number of staffed beds available in a
hospital, regardless of treatment, suggest that the attention of hospital price, cost, and
quality watchdogs should be instead directed towards hospital bed size. While bed size
does increase for a hospital organization as a result of hospital mergers or acquisitions,
the results suggest that large hospitals are charging higher prices, have higher costs to
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payers, and lower quality regardless of consolidation status, implying that M&A with
significant bed size changes should be scrutinized, but hospitals which are already large
or debating expansion should be investigated as well.

!

C. Limitations of the Study
The findings of this study are not without limitations. The results presented in the
OLS regressions may suffer from the problem of endogeneity identified by Dafny (2009)
due to the fact that hospital merger motivations are not controlled for in the OLS
regressions because it is difficult to encompass all outstanding motivations. The estimates
presented in all methods of estimation may be biased because revenue, quality
performance, staffed bed, and hospital type data came from the most recent data
available, creating a time mismatch between the consolidated and unconsolidated hospital
information. This also curtailed the breadth of analysis on revenue and quality
performance as only one year of data was available for these variables.

!
D. Suggestions for Future Research
!

The results of this study present an interesting question, future research could

debate whether or not hospitals need to charge more in order to achieve higher quality
outcomes. To further the work of this study, an expanded list of diagnoses could be
included to gather more conclusive results, and matching hospitals within their direct
Hospital Referral Region (HRR) could provide an interesting examination of the potential
anti-competitive effects of hospital M&A. Additionally, if a greater range of payment
data became publicly available, analysis on a lengthier history of hospital consolidation
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could be completed. A separate study could look at what is occurring in terms of the
results of lower prices combined with higher revenues to ascertain if hospitals are serving
more patients or simply charging more for diagnoses not examined in this study.

!
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TABLES
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for variables

!

Variables

Unconsolidated
Hospitals

Consolidated Hospitals

918,509.80
(56,618.90)

917,009.70
(20,403.14)*

Total Performance Score
Reported out of 100

37.36
(0.19)

35.01
(0.83)*

Beds
Number of Staffed Beds

226.96
(3.60)

227.47
(10.30)

Number of Observations

3,116

161

Medicare Payments 291
Heart Failure & Shock w/ Complications or
Comorbidities

8,968.13
(51.26)

8,805.99
(154.62)

Average Total Payments 291
Heart Failure & Shock w/ Complications or
Comorbidities

9,947.20
(56.69)

9,781.54
(171.25)

Average Covered Charges 291
Heart Failure & Shock w/ Complications or
Comorbidities

35,792.90
(519.22)

30,301.89
(1,586.80)*

1,634

86

Medicare Payments 039
Extracranial Procedures without Complications or
Comorbidities

5,596.63
(35.25)

5,374.80
(87.85)

Average Total Payments 039
Extracranial Procedures without Complications or
Comorbidities

7,228.69
(47.91)

7,027.89
(139.93)

Average Covered Charges 039
Extracranial Procedures without Complications or
Comorbidities

32,123.72
(468.83)

26,542.59
(1,600.37)*

987

57

Medicare Payments 190
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder w/ Major
Complications or Comorbidities

6,726.65
(28.19)

6,648.34
(88.05)

Average Total Payments 190
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder w/ Major
Complications or Comorbidities

7,967.70
(33.14)

7,862.92
(108.46)

Average Covered Charges 190
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder w/ Major
Complications or Comorbidities

30,133.44
(335.47)

27,749.87
(1,327.42)

Overall Hospital Metrics
Gross Patient Revenue

In Thousands of U.S. Dollars

Diagnoses

Number of Observations

Number of Observations
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Number of Observations

2,891

154

Medicare Payments 193
Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy w/ Major
Complications or Comorbidities

8,858.60
(34.64)

8,395.19
(110.21)

Average Total Payments 193
Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy w/ Major
Complications or Comorbidities

9,806.925
(39.39)

9,665.70
(134.71)

Average Covered Charges 193
Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy w/ Major
Complications or Comorbidities

37,821.97
(411.05)

33,672.82
(1,529.72)*

2,787

150

Medicare Payments 282
Acute Myocardial Infarction, Discharged Alive w/
out Complications or Comorbidities

4,150.87
(38.67)

3,992.73
(118.25)

Average Total Payments 282
Acute Myocardial Infarction, Discharged Alive w/
out Complications or Comorbidities

5,392.43
(46.74)

5,273.36
(174.97)

Average Covered Charges 282
Acute Myocardial Infarction, Discharged Alive w/
out Complications or Comorbidities

25,068.05
(506.18)

2,1132.72
(1,620.34)

635

38

Number of Observations

Number of Observations

Note: The above values are the observed means. The standard errors are below in parentheses. All
monetary values are in constant 2015 dollars. Diagnosis definitions were provided by cms.gov.
*An indication of that the observed mean of the consolidated hospitals is significantly different
from the observed mean of the unconsolidated hospitals, p<0.05.
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Table 2. Estimates of the effects of mergers and acquisitions using OLS with the log
of revenue, log of performance, and logs of prices and costs for selected diagnoses as
dependent variables.
OLS Regressor Estimates
Dependent Variables

logGrossPatientRevenue
In U.S. Dollars

(1)
Treatment

(2)
Beds

0.231
(0.059)**

0.399
(0.006)**

R-squared
logTotalPerformanceScore

0.634
-0.090
(0.023)**

Reported out of 100

R-squared
logMedicarePayments291

0.140
-0.003
(0.017)

Heart Failure & Shock w/ Complications or Comorbidities

R-squared
logAverageTotalPayments291

0.379

R-squared
logAverageCoveredCharges291

R-squared
logMedicarePayments039

Extracranial Procedures without Complications or Comorbidities

Extracranial Procedures w/out Complications or Comorbidities

-0.035
(0.020)

Extracranial Procedures w/out Complications or Comorbidities

-0.012
(0.021)

Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder w/ Major Complications or
Comorbidities

-0.128
(0.0524)***

0.028
(0.005)**

0.363
-0.0056
(0.013)***

R-squared
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder w/ Major Complications or
Comorbidities

0.029
(0.002)**
0.402

R-squared
logMedicarePayments190

0.027
(0.0020)**
0.410

R-squared
logAverageCoveredCharges039

0.076
(0.0047)**

0.499

R-squared
logAverageTotalPayments039

0.039
(0.0019)**

0.396
-0.048
(0.0425)

Heart Failure & Shock w/ Complications or Comorbidities
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0.036
(0.002)**

-0.00090
(0.017)

Heart Failure & Shock w/ Complications or Comorbidities

logAverageTotalPayments190

-0.035
(0.002)**

0.031
(0.0015)**

0.357
-0.010
(0.012)

0.034
(0.0014)**

R-squared
logAverageCoveredCharges190

Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder w/ Major Complications or
Comorbidities

0.366
-0.0092
(0.0305)

R-squared
logMedicarePayments193

Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy w/ Major Complications or Comorbidities

0.519
-0.0155
(0.0124)

R-squared
logAverageTotalPayments193

Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy w/ Major Complications or Comorbidities

-0.012
(0.0121)

-0.0519
(0.032)

-0.00882
(0.0286)

R-squared

0.024
(0.0029)**

0.361
0.002
(0.027)

R-squared
logAverageCoveredCharges282
Acute Myocardial Infarction, Discharged Alive w/out Complications or
Comorbidities

0.059
(0.0035)**

0.490

R-squared
logAverageTotalPayments282
Acute Myocardial Infarction, Discharged Alive w/out Complications or
Comorbidities

0.036
(0.0014)**

0.380

R-squared
logMedicarePayments282
Acute Myocardial Infarction, Discharged Alive w/out Complications or
Comorbidities

0.031
(0.0014)**

0.365

R-squared
logAverageCoveredCharges193
Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy w/ Major Complications or Comorbidities

0.063
(0.0035)**

0.031
(0.0027)**
0.360

-0.016
(0.066)

0.060
0.0067**
0.448
3,277

Sample Size

Note: The above values are the regression coefficients. The standard errors are below in
parentheses. R-squared values are in italics. The values for beds represent a change of 100 beds.
All monetary values are in constant 2015 dollars. Diagnoses definitions were provided by
cms.gov.
*** = Significant at 1%, ** = Significant at 5%, * = Significant at 10%
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Table 3. Estimates of the effects of mergers and acquisitions using matching
methods with the log of revenue, log of performance, and the logs of prices and costs
for selected diagnoses as dependent variables.
Matching Methods Estimates
Dependent Variables

(1)
Nearest Neighbor

(1)
Kernel

(3)
Stratificatio
n

0.550
(0.148)**

0.278
(0.088)***

0.310
(0.076)***

logTotalPerformanceScore

-0.062
(0.038)

-0.091
(0.023)***

-0.106
(0.024)***

logMedicarePayments291

-0.031
(0.031)

-0.018
(0.019)

-0.027
(0.018)

logAverageTotalPayments291

-0.027
(0.025)

-0.017
(0.015)

-0.025
(0.016)

logAverageCoveredCharges291

-0.314
(0.101)**

-0.140
(0.051)***

-0.133
(0.056)**

logMedicarePayments039

-0.050
(0.028)*

-0.042
(0.014)**

N/A

logAverageTotalPayments039

-0.084
(0.040)***

-0.031
(0.023)

N/A

logAverageCoveredCharges039

-0.367
(0.085)***

-0.233
(0.060)***

N/A

logMedicarePayments190

-0.045
(0.027)*

-0.012
(0.012)

-0.018
(0.014)

logAverageTotalPayments190

-0.054
(0.025)**

-0.017
(0.014)

-0.020
(0.013)

logAverageCoveredCharges190

-0.270
(0.080)***

-0.085
(0.040)**

-0.063
(0.037)*

logMedicarePayments193

-0.043
(0.021)**

-0.017
(0.013)

-0.023
(0.012)*

-0.049
(0.030)

-0.014
(0.012)

-0.019
(0.015)

logGrossPatientRevenue
In U.S. Dollars
Reported out of 100

Heart Failure & Shock w/ Complications or
Comorbidities
Heart Failure & Shock w/ Complications or
Comorbidities
Heart Failure & Shock w/ Complications or
Comorbidities
Extracranial Procedures without
Complications or Comorbidities
Extracranial Procedures w/out
Complications or Comorbidities
Extracranial Procedures w/out
Complications or Comorbidities

Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder w/
Major Complications or Comorbidities
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder w/
Major Complications or Comorbidities
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder w/
Major Complications or Comorbidities
Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy w/ Major
Complications or Comorbidities

logAverageTotalPayments193

Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy w/ Major
Complications or Comorbidities
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logAverageCoveredCharges193
Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy w/ Major
Complications or Comorbidities

-0.278
(0.072)***

-0.109
(0.033)***

-0.099
(0.046)**

logMedicarePayments282
Acute Myocardial Infarction, Discharged
Alive w/out Complications or Comorbidities

-0.007
(0.034)

-0.031
(0.023)

-0.031
(0.029)

logAverageTotalPayments282
Acute Myocardial Infarction, Discharged
Alive w/out Complications or Comorbidities

0.004
(0.042)

-0.022
(0.025)

-0.020
(0.031)

logAverageCoveredCharges282
Acute Myocardial Infarction, Discharged
Alive w/out Complications or Comorbidities

-0.228
(0.111)**

-0.172
(0.071)**

-0.125
(0.079)

3,277

3,277

3,277

Sample Size

Note: The above values are the regression coefficients. The standard errors are below in
parentheses. The values for beds represent a change of 100 beds. All monetary values are in
constant 2015 dollars. N/A values resulted from diagnoses not having sufficient information to
support the models. Diagnoses definitions were provided by cms.gov.
*** = Significant at 1%, ** = Significant at 5%, * = Significant at 10%
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APPENDIX

!

APPENDIX A1
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION AND SOURCES

!

Note: All monetary values were chained to constant 2015 dollars to remove the effect of
inflation from the analysis.

!

GrossPatientRevenue: Gross Patient Revenue is the “sticker price” for hospital

services provided to patients during a fiscal year. This is the amount of U.S. dollars a
hospital would receive for their services rendered if insurers did not negotiate lower rates
or issue denials, or if hospitals did not provide charity care or fall victim to bad debts.
Source: American Hospital Directory “Hospital Statistics by State”.
TotalPerformanceScore: The total performance score received by a hospital is a
combined score which comes from four equally weighted component scores. The first
score is the clinical care domain, which looks at hospital mortality rates. The Patient
Experience score is the second component and is derived from mandatory follow up
services administered to Medicare patients after a stay in the hospital. The safety domain
comes from a range of sources, including a patient safety measure, infection prevention
measures, and delivery of care measures. The last component included to arrive at the
total performance score is the efficiency and cost reduction component, which looks at
Medicare Spending per Beneficiary. Hospitals must have scores in at least 3 of the 4
components to receive an overall score, and their final total performance score is the
weighted average of all of their components, with an eligible range of 0 to 100 Source:
Data.Medicare.gov Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (HVBP) - Total Performance Score
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Database (https://data.medicare.gov/Hospital-Compare/Hospital-Value-BasedPurchasing-HVBP-Total-Perform/ypbt-wvdk).
MedicarePayments291: The average cost in USD to Medicare for patients with
DRG 291: Heart Failure & Shock with Major Complications or Comorbidities. Source:
Medicare, “The Inpatient Utilization and Payment Public Use File”.
AverageTotalPayment291: The average total cost to patients and secondary
insurances in USD for a diagnosis of DRG 291: Heart Failure & Shock with Major
Complications or Comorbidities. Source: Medicare, “The Inpatient Utilization and
Payment Public Use File”.
AverageCoveredCharges291: The average total price in USD charged by hospitals
for a diagnosis of DRG 291: Heart Failure & Shock with Major Complications or
Comorbidities. Source: Medicare, “The Inpatient Utilization and Payment Public Use
File”.
MedicarePayments039: The average cost in USD to Medicare for patients with
DRG 039: Extracranial Procedures without Complications or Major Complications or
Comorbidities. Source: Medicare, “The Inpatient Utilization and Payment Public Use
File”.
AverageTotalPayments039: The average total cost to patients and secondary
insurances in USD for a diagnosis of DRG 039: Extracranial Procedures without
Complications or Major Complications or Comorbidities. Source: Medicare, “The
Inpatient Utilization and Payment Public Use File”.
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AverageCoveredCharges039: The average total price in USD charged by hospitals
for a diagnosis of DRG 039: Extracranial Procedures without Complications or Major
Complications or Comorbidities. Source: Medicare, “The Inpatient Utilization and
Payment Public Use File”.
MedicarePayments190: The average cost in USD to Medicare for patients with
DRG 190: Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder with Major Complications or
Comorbidities. Source: Medicare, “The Inpatient Utilization and Payment Public Use
File”.
AverageTotalPayments190: The average total cost to patients and secondary
insurances in USD for a diagnosis of DRG 190: Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder
with Major Complications or Comorbidities. Source: Medicare, “The Inpatient
Utilization and Payment Public Use File”.
AverageCoveredCharges190: The average total price in USD charged by hospitals
for a diagnosis of DRG 190: Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder with Major
Complications or Comorbidities. Source: Medicare, “The Inpatient Utilization and
Payment Public Use File”.
MedicarePayments193: The average cost in USD to Medicare for patients with
DRG 193: Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy with Major Complications or Comorbidities.
Source: Medicare, “The Inpatient Utilization and Payment Public Use File”.
AverageTotalPayments193: The average total cost to patients and secondary
insurances in USD for a diagnosis of DRG 193: Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy with
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Major Complications or Comorbidities. Source: Medicare, “The Inpatient Utilization and
Payment Public Use File”.
AverageCoveredCharges193: The average total price in USD charged by hospitals
for a diagnosis of DRG 193: Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy with Major Complications or
Comorbidities. Source: Medicare, “The Inpatient Utilization and Payment Public Use
File”.
MedicarePayments282: The average cost in USD to Medicare for patients with
DRG 282: Acute Myocardial Infarction, Discharged Alive without Complications or
Major Complications or Comorbidities. Source: Medicare, “The Inpatient Utilization and
Payment Public Use File”.
AverageTotalPayments282: The average total cost to patients and secondary
insurances in USD for a diagnosis of DRG 282: Acute Myocardial Infarction, Discharged
Alive without Complications or Major Complications or Comorbidities. Source:
Medicare, “The Inpatient Utilization and Payment Public Use File”.
AverageCoveredCharges282: The average total price in USD charged by hospitals
for a diagnosis of DRG 282: Acute Myocardial Infarction, Discharged Alive without
Complications or Major Complications or Comorbidities. Source: Medicare, “The
Inpatient Utilization and Payment Public Use File”.
Treatment: Hospitals which underwent a merger or acquisition between 2012 and
2014 were assigned a value of 1 for this dummy variable specification. These hospitals
were identified through the use of yearly merger and acquisition reports for the years
2012, 2013, and 2014. All hospitals included in the analysis which did not undergo a
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consolidation activity in the above specified years received a dummy variable value of
“0”. Source: Irving Levin Associates “The Health Services Acquisition Report” Years
2012, 2013, 2014.
Beds: This number is a measure of how many staffed beds all hospitals registered
with the American Hospital Directory had in the year 2017. Staffed beds is the number of
beds a hospital has adequate staff to provide care for within state legal guidelines. This
number may differ from the amount of licensed beds a hospital has, which is the number
of permitted beds in a hospital facility, regardless of staffing levels. Source: AHD
“Hospital Statistics by State”.
HospitalType: The ownership type of U.S. hospitals. This is defined by what type
of organization the hospital is reported as for tax purposes, originally divided by
Government, Voluntary Nonprofit, or Proprietary (For-profit). Government and Voluntary
Nonprofit are further divided. Government is divided into Federal, State, Local, and
Hospital District Authority while Voluntary Nonprofit is delineated by Private, Church,
and Other. Source: Data Lists: “U.S. Hospital Database”.
State: The state which each hospital included in the analysis is registered in. Each
state received a dummy variable value which was equal to 1 when a hospital in that state
was being assessed, or 0 when the hospital being assessed was from a different state.
Source: AHD “Hospital Statistics by State”.

!
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APPENDIX A2
DESCRIPTION OF MATCHING METHODS USED FOR ESTIMATION
The three matching methods presented in this analysis are variations of propensity
score matching. Propensity score matching is a statistical technique which seeks to
determine the effect of a treatment or policy, making it suitable for examining the effect
of the observational consolidation “treatment” in this study (Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983). After being divided into consolidated and unconsolidated groups, the hospitals in
this study received their propensity score based upon their number of staffed beds, the
state in which their primary address is listed, and the year in which they underwent a
merger or acquisition if one occurred at all. Once both the merged and unmerged hospital
groups received their propensity score, they were compared via the three matching
methods as described below. Each matching method uses a specific methodology to
measure the differences between the consolidated and unconsolidated hospitals in an
attempt to ascertain what effect hospital mergers and acquisitions have on the financial
and quality outcomes evaluated in this study.

!
Nearest Neighbor Matching
Nearest neighbor matching is one of the most commonly used methods of
propensity score matching and compares the treatment entities to the control entities
which are most like them in terms of propensity score. Nearest neighbor matching first
divides the treated and control groups and then randomly orders both groups. The first
treated entity is then matched with the control entity with the propensity score which is
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the shortest distance from its own score. The matching continues down the list until all of
the treated entities receive a match. All control entities which do not match with a
treatment entity are then discarded. Outputs for nearest neighbor matching represent the
differences between a treated entity and the nearest available control comparator. This
method effectively minimizes the difference between the estimated propensity scores for
the two groups, considering the effects of treatment on entities by comparing entities
which are most like each other based upon the contributing factors to the propensity score
(Stuart, 2010).

!
Kernel Matching
Kernel Matching evaluates the differences between treatment and control groups
by first computing the average of the propensity scores of all of the control entities. The
propensity score of each treated entity is then compared to the computed average of the
control entities, with the resulting output coefficients being the differences between the
treated entity and the average of the control entities. Because kernel matching takes the
average of the controls, this often lowers the variance of the outcomes, but also may not
always be an example of the best matches because the treated entities may not always be
similar to the entity represented by the average of the controls (Caliendo and Kopeining,
2008).

!
!
!
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Stratification Matching
The goal of stratification matching is to eliminate bias which could arise from the
underlying variables. After separating the propensity scores of the treated and control
entities into two defined groups the propensity scores are ranked and stratified into five
equal size groups. The corresponding quintiles are then compared, effectively
demonstrating the differences between two stratums which theoretically have similar
propensity scores, assuming the treated and control groups have propensity score ranges
that are similar. The regression outputs show the average of the differences between the
treated and control stratums (Austin, 2011).
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